Drawing on ideas from game theory and quantum physics, we investigate nonlocal correlations from the point of view of equilibria in games of incomplete information. These equilibria can be classified in decreasing power as general communication equilibria, beliefinvariant equilibria and correlated equilibria, all of which contain the familiar Nash equilibria.
Introduction
The notion of equilibrium of a strategic game and the mathematical formulation of rational behaviour in situations of conflict are among the most fruitful ideas in the history of economics, and duly became a cornerstone of any modern discussion on the subject.
The topic was initiated by the classic treatment of von Neumann and Morgenstern [vNM44] , where it was realized that in the realm of mixed strategy there is always a minimax equilibrium for zero-sum games. Another milestone was the definition of Nash equilibrium [Nas50] and Nash's proof that in mixed strategies there always exists one. These pioneering results were followed by a multitude of further investigations into other concepts of equilibrium and their properties, including the question of how the players, knowing the game, can find one [Aum74, For93, LH64, DGP09, CDT09] . Motivated, among other things, by the realization that Nash equilibria sometimes can be "bad" both individually and collectively for the players, a major direction in game theory is the question of how to induce players, or help them, to a more beneficial equilibrium [FT91, Mye91, NRTV07] . One important idea is that giving the players advice, in the form of a random variable, can change the landscape of equilibria. This generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium to correlated equilibria [Aum74] .
The present paper is about advice in the setting of games of incomplete information. As it turns out, this is a subject of considerable complexity, since the kind of correlation that can serve as advice to the players can be far more general than in the case of complete information. In games of incomplete information, or Bayesian games, each player has a type which is not perfectly known to, but only estimated by, the other players. Depending on what the game models, a type can be many things. For example, it can represent a characteristic of the player (strong, weak, rich, poor, etc.) or a secret objective of the player (interest in one particular outcome). For this class of games, a relevant solution concept is the communication equilibrium [For82] . Here, the players privately communicate their type to a mediator, who implements a correlation and gives each player advice for a convenient action. It is reasonable to assume that players are comfortable with revealing their private information to a trusted mediator if this gives them an advantage. However, there are situations where it might be crucial for players never to reveal any private information to the other players (e.g., trade secrets). In game theory, this concept has been noted before when discussing correlations. In [For93, For06] it is called "conditional independence property" or "belief-invariance", while in [LRS10] it is called "non-communicating garbling" and in [Liu15] is called "individually uninformativeness". In the above cases, however, this property is used to make the analysis of the equilibria more convenient, and is not highlighted as interesting in its own right.
From a completely different angle, belief-invariance has been a topic of research in physics (motivated by questions in the foundations of quantum mechanics [PR94, Tsi80, BLM + 05, MAG06]) and theoretical computer science (motivated by multi-prover interactive proof systems [KRR14] and parallel repetition of games [BFS14, FRV16, LW15] ), under the name of non-signalling correlations. In these investigations, belief-invariance is relevant because it describes the largest class of correlations that obey relativistic causality.
Here, we bring together the strands of thought coming from these two backgrounds. On the one hand, this results in a more general and much richer picture of non-locality as a resource and, on the other hand, allows us to import findings from the physics of non-locality and nonsignalling to game theory. The interdisciplinarity leaves us with the problem of choosing the language in which to formulate our results, as we might end up not reaching anyone from either side of the discipline divide. We have chosen to use a language familiar to game theorists, but hopefully not too far from the one used in physics and computer science.
We define and study the class of belief-invariant communication equilibria and compare it with the classes of communication equilibria and correlated equilibria. We discuss, always in the language of game theory, relevant examples from physics [CHSH69, GHSZ90, BL13, PKL + 15] and we introduce new ones. Our examples are applied to the study of the social welfare of games. Namely, we exhibit a game where belief-invariance is socially better than any correlated equilibrium, and a game where all non-belief-invariant communication equilibria have a suboptimal social welfare.
We then proceed to show that there is a subclass of the belief-invariant correlations that gives rise to the interesting concept of "fully private correlations": correlations that reveal the type of a player neither to the other players nor to the mediator, and still can achieve equilibrium outcomes that would be impossible without an informed mediator. However, to implement this class one needs to rely on quantum mechanical effects. For this reason, in a stand-alone section, we give a brief introduction to some basic linear algebraic notions behind quantum mechanics and we consider a class of correlations that arises from observing a shared quantum mechanical state. We will prove that there are games for which the resulting equilibria have better social welfare than the ones that may be achieved without quantum effects. Note that we need games of incomplete information to exhibit this quantum advantage: Zhang [Zha12] proved that in games of full information, there can be no quantum advantage. The use of quantum mechanical correlations in game theory has been studied in many forms and flavours, as can be seen from the survey [GZK08] , the references therein, and the more recent works [BL13, PKL + 15]. However, to the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to unify communication equilibria, belief invariance, quantum equilibria and correlated equilibria in a general framework.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 defines the objects we are working on: first games of incomplete information and then various classes of correlations. Section 3 uses these concepts to define the classes of equilibria we study. In Section 4 we discuss some meaningful examples where belief-invariance helps reaching a better social outcome. In Section 5, we will discuss some practical applications of our new definitions. No quantum physics is involved in the sections above; only in Section 6 we broaden the discussion to include the quantum case, and we will present it in a way that makes it fit into the framework we have developed up to that point. Finally, we will discuss some open problems in the conclusions section.
Preliminaries
In this section we define the basic concepts we need to discuss our classes of equilibria. First we will define games of incomplete information and their strategies. Later, we will define the notion of correlation and the classes of probability distributions we need.
Games with incomplete information
There are several slightly different notations for games of incomplete information. We will follow the one of Forges [For06] because of the closeness with our topic. We find it convenient to work with games in strategic form because of the similarity with the approach in quantum information to so-called non-local games. In a game in strategic form, in a single round, all players make their moves simultaneously, and receive their respective payoffs. It is worth mentioning that games of incomplete information, as presented here, are also called Bayesian games (because there is a fixed prior distribution on the types), and can be analyzed in a probability theory setting.
A game with incomplete information G is defined by the following objects:
• A finite set of players N , of size n, usually N = [n];
• A finite set of type profiles T := T 1 × · · · × T n ;
• A finite set of action profiles A := A 1 × · · · × A n ;
• A prior probability distribution P (t) on the types t ∈ T ;
• For each player i ∈ N , a payoff function
In a game of incomplete information, the behaviour of the players is modelled as follows. A strategy g i for the player i is a map from the information that i knows to an action a i ∈ A i . In the absence of any correlation or external advice, players can apply pure strategies or mixed ones. A pure strategy for player i is a map g i : T i → A i , meaning that players select an action based only on their type. A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over pure ones, i.e. the function g i : T i → A i becomes a random variable. If we want to make its distribution explicit, we introduce the independent local random variables λ i with probability Λ i (λ i ). and we set g i = g i,λ i = g i (·, λ i ). This random function describes a conditional probability distribution on A i given T i , denoted by slight abuse of notation as g i (a i | t i ).
The game goes as follows. The types t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) are sampled according to P . Each player i learns his type t i , uses his strategy g i to select an action a i ∈ A i , and is awarded according to his payoff function v i (which in general depends also on the other players' actions and types). Hence, the expected utility of player i is:
where g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) and a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Observe that if P is a point mass on a fixed type t 0 , P (t 0 ) = 1, we recover the usual games of complete information. A game is called full coordination game if all the payoff functions are equal, i.e., all players are interested in the same outcome. On the other hand, if the payoff functions are distinct, we talk about a game of conflicting interests.
A solution for a game is a family of strategies g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ), one for each player. Players are modelled as being selfish and rational, meaning that fixing the other players' strategies, each player chooses the strategy that maximizes his own expected payoff, by using the resources he has access to. A solution is then said to be an equilibrium (more precisely a Nash equilibrium) if no player has an incentive to change the adopted strategy. In the basic, uncorrelated, case, this means that
for all i and χ i ∈ A
i . This can be expressed more concisely as saying that for all i, t i and a i ,
where λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ), and, by independence of
. Note also that a game of incomplete information can be modelled as a game of complete information where the players' strategies are A
e., all possible functions from T i to A i . Then, by Nash's theorem [Nas50] , every game of incomplete information has an equilibrium. In fact, as is familiar from games of complete information, usually -except in the simplest situations -we have to expect several Nash equilibria to exist, with different payoff profiles ( v i : i ∈ N ).
The expected social welfare SW(g) of a solution g is the sum of the expected payoffs of all players, SW(g) = i v i , and often used as a measure of the quality of an equilibrium. More generally, we may consider some other function v(t, a) of the types and actions (e.g., the max of the expected payoffs of all players is the measure that is commonly adopted in the job scheduling setting [AT01] ), and look at the social payoff SPO defined as follows:
Example: CHSH game [CHSH69] . We now give an example of game of incomplete information. The game is a classic example from quantum information, that later was also independently found in game theory (cf. [For06, LRS10, Liu15] ). We will refer to this game several times in the paper. The game is called CHSH after the authors of [CHSH69] , Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt.
It is a two-player game, with respective types and actions of players (t 1 , t 2 ) and (a 1 , a 2 ). Both players' types and actions are single bits, taking values from the set {0, 1}. The distribution P on the types (t 1 , t 2 ) is uniform, i.e. probability 1 4 is assigned to each of the four possibilities. The game is a full coordination game, i.e., the payoff functions v 1 , v 2 are equal and the players want to achieve a common goal. The payoffs are as in Figure 1 . In other words, the two players
Figure 1: The CHSH game prefer to correlate if at least one of them has the first type (which happens with probability 3 4 ), and to anti-correlate if they both have the second type (with probability 1 4 ). A simple pure strategy for each player in the CHSH game is the constant function mapping to 0. Since the distribution P is uniform, such joint action by players give an expected payoff of 3 4 . It is not hard to see that this cannot be improved with other pure or mixed, or correlated strategies. Later we will see that, in presence of external devices, other equilibria exist that reach the optimal expected payoff of 1.
Correlations: joint conditional probability distributions
Looking at eq. (1), we see that for a well-defined expected payoff, we only need a joint distribution of t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) and a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ). In fact, since the marginal distribution P (t) of the types is fixed, we only require a conditional distribution of a given t.
This motivates us to consider, as a resource in gameplay, a general correlation, i.e. a joint conditional probability distribution Q(s 1 , . . . , s n | r 1 , . . . , r n ) of inputs r i and outputs s i for player i. We may abbreviate the notation as Q(s | r) for tuples r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∈ R = × i R i and s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S = × i S i , where R i and S i are the input and output alphabets of player i, respectively.
Note that we do not assume any restriction on these correlations, apart from the obvious requirements of probability distributions:
Given a set R of inputs and a set S of outputs we denote as ALL(S | R), the set of all possible correlations on these sets.
By imposing additional restrictions we can single out other meaningful subclasses of correlations, that we will use later to define different kinds of equilibrium.
Belief-invariant (aka non-signalling) correlations. A joint conditional probability distribution Q is belief-invariant (also called non-signalling) if the distribution of the output variable s i given r i does not give any information about r j , with j = i. This class is easily seen to be strictly contained in the general class of correlations. Indeed, the belief-invariant condition is clearly violated in a correlation where s i could be just equal to r j , i.e., Pr{s i = r j } = 1.
The names belief-invariant and non-signalling can be understood in the following way. Suppose we have n parties, with the i-th party having access only to r i , s i . Then the observation of r i , s i does not reveal anything more about the other parties' r j variables than r i alone. Therefore if the parties had a estimation (belief) of what could be the others' variables, this is not changed by the observation of the outputs of the correlation Q.
Formally, for a set I ⊂ N , let R I = × i∈I R i and S I = × i∈I S i . Then, we say that a correlation Q(s | r) is belief-invariant [KRR14] for all subsets I ⊂ N and J = N \ I,
Given a set R of inputs and a set S of outputs we denote as BINV(S | R), the set of all beliefinvariant correlations on these sets. We remark that this class of correlations has various equivalent definitions (see, for example, [MAG06] ), but we prefer the one given above since it makes it clear that any subset of parties, even when getting together, cannot learn anything more about the other subset's input variables than what they would know from the joint distribution of their {R i } i∈I alone.
Local correlations. A joint conditional probability distribution Q is called local if it can be simulated locally by each party i, by observing (their part of) a random variable γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) (with distribution V (γ)) independent of r, and doing local operations depending only on r i and γ i . More formally, a correlation Q(s | r) is local if there exist a random variable γ and distributions
Any local distribution is also belief-invariant, because the condition (4) is respected. However, the opposite is not true, meaning that the inclusion is strict. An example of non-local beliefinvariant distribution is given below in (10).
As above, given a set R of inputs and a set S of outputs we denote as LOC(S | R), the set of all local correlations on these sets. We remark that the sets ALL(S | R), BINV(S | R) and LOC(S | R) are all closed convex sets.
Equilibria with communication and correlation resources
Consider a game G = (N, T, A, P, {v i }) as defined in Section 2.1. A solution with communication for G studies the behaviour of players who have access to a correlation device that depends on inputs communicated by them during the game. The most common operational interpretation of this setting is that a trusted mediator, who has private communication channels with all the players, collects from each player i the input r i , samples s according to Q(s | r) and sends to each i the output s i .
Formally, we add to the strategies of the players the use of a correlation Q(s | r), where r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ∈ R is a tuple of inputs and s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S is a tuple of outputs. In this setting, a pure strategy for each player i is a pair of functions, f i : T i → R i and g i : T i × S i → A i ; and a mixed strategy is a pair of jointly distributed random functions (
As done above, the latter can be given explicitly by specifying a local random variable λ i for each player i with distribution Λ i (λ i ), and letting
, reflecting the fact that the n pairs {(f i , g i ) : i = 1, . . . , n} are independent.
The game now goes as follows. The types t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) are sampled according to P . Each player i learns his type t i , and sends the input r i = f i (t i ) to the correlation device. He then gets the correlation output s i and plays the action a i = g i (t i , s i ). This makes all of t, r, f , g and a jointly distributed random variables. The expected payoff of player i is:
We now give the definitions of some classes of equilibria, introduced by Forges [For82] , that are meaningful in this setting with communication: communication equilibria, belief-invariant communication equilibria and correlated equilibria. A new class, namely quantum equilibria, will be defined later in Section 6. Communication and correlated equilibria were explicitly discussed in previous work, notably [Aum74, For82, For93, For06] . The intermediate class of belief-invariant (and the quantum variant of Section 6) was previously discussed only indirectly in some works, for example [For93, LRS10, PKL + 15].
Communication equilibrium
The most general class we consider here is the class of communication equilibria. Here, we assume that the correlation device can implement a correlation Q that is unrestricted. We will obtain later two meaningful subclasses by restricting the class of available correlations.
In order to formally define a solution for a game we need to describe not only the correlation Q implemented by the correlation device, but also the strategies, i.e., the functions {f i } and {g i }, and the private randomness used by the players. To this aim, given an ntuple x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we use the standard abbreviation x −i to denote the (n − 1)-tuple (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ), i.e., x with the i-th entry removed. Similarly, if f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a family of functions in which each f i is a function of an argument x i , we denote f −i = (f 1 , . . . , f i−1 , f i+1 , . . . , f n ) the family with the i-th member removed, and by
is a communication equilibrium of a game G if for each player i and for all random functions ϕ i : T i → R i and χ i :
This definition captures the idea of having no incentive to deviate unilaterally, but it may seem a formidable task to verify the conditions it imposes. Note that it is w.l.o.g. to assume that in the above definition ϕ i and χ i are deterministic, i.e., not depending on λ i . Hence, it easily follows that we do not have to go over all functions ϕ i , but it is sufficient to go over all its possible outputs r i , as stated by the next proposition.
is a communication equilibrium of a game G if for all i, t i , r i and functions
The canonical form. Definition 1 is useful for understanding the subclasses of equilibria we define later. However, it is possible to express the communication equilibria in a simpler canonical form, where players communicate their types (not a function of the type) to the correlation device, and the latter returns the actions they have to take (not only an information from which players compute their action). The intuition is that the mediator, who implements the correlation Q(s | r) also takes care of the computation of the functions r i = f i (t i ) and
, we construct a new solution where we have a correlation Q(a | t) in which inputs are types, outputs are actions, and which works as follows:
It is clear that the expected payoffs for this solution when the players truthfully reveal their type and take the suggested action (that is, when their strategy corresponds to identity functions id both for inputs and outputs) are the same as those of the original solution:
Furthermore, we have the following important proposition.
Proposition 3. If (f , g, Q) is a communication equilibrium, then the associated canonical strategy (id, id, Q) is a communication equilibrium with the same expected payoffs. In words, no player has an incentive to communicate a false type, or to take an action different from the one suggested.
Proof. Since (f , g, Q) is an equilibrium, no player has an incentive in communicating a false type or in taking an action different from the one that has been suggested. If in Q there is a player i who can increase his expected payoff by deviating from the suggested action on a type t i , then the same deviation would increase the expected payoff of player i in (f , g, Q) for t i . This contradicts the assumption that (f , g, Q) is an equilibrium. It follows that (id, id, Q) is an equilibrium as well. Because it preserves the conditional distribution of actions given types of (f , g, Q), it also preserves the expected payoffs.
Notice that there are (infinitely) many equilibria (f , g, Q) that lead to the same canonical equilibrium Q. In fact, (7) and Proposition 3 imply an equivalence relation on solutions. Also notice that each equivalence class of a communication equilibrium contains exactly one canonical equilibrium, which we call the canonical representative.
Note also that, since the communicated information comprises only types and actions, these are the only two deviations that a player can take. Therefore, we can simplify the notion of communication equilibrium as follows.
Definition 4 (Canonical communication equilibrium).
A solution (id, id, Q) is a canonical communication equilibrium if there exists an equilibrium (f , g, Q ′ ) in its equivalence class, i.e. if the former is the canonical representative of the latter, Q = Q ′ .
Equivalently, in light of the above proposition, (id, id, Q) is a canonical communication equilibrium if for all i, t i , r i and α i ∈ A A i i a function from A i to itself,
The above observations imply that as far as communication equilibria are concerned, we may without loss of generality restrict our attention to their canonical representatives. Then, for given game G, we denote as Comm(G) the set of canonical communication equilibria for G. The next proposition shows that, for every game, this is a convex set.
Proposition 5. If (id, id, Q 1 ) and (id, id, Q 2 ) are canonical communication equilibria for the same game G, then so is (id, id, Q),
Proof. Consider the following correlation, with a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A, b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) ∈ {0, 1} n and t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ T :
That is, Q ′ chooses with probability p and 1 − p to provide Q 1 and Q 2 , respectively, and informs the players of its choice along with the recommended actions a. Thus it is clear from the fact that (id, id, Q 1 ) and (id, id, Q 2 ) are equilibria, that (id, id, Q ′ ) (where players do not output the b i variables) is an equilibrium, too. The proof is concluded by observing that Q = Q ′ is the canonical representative of Q ′ .
An example. Consider again the CHSH game described above. A communication equilibrium for the CHSH game consists in players revealing their type to the mediator, receiving information about which game are they playing (i.e., information about the type of the other player), and which action they are suggested to play in that game, and following the advice of the mediator. Formally, consider inputs (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ T and outputs (s 1 , s 2 ) where s i ∈ A i × {0, 1}. Moreover, consider a correlation Q such that Q(00, 00 | r 1 · r 2 = 0) = 1 and Q(01, 11 | r 1 · r 2 = 1) = 1. Then, the solution (id, s 1 , Q), where s 1 is the function that returns the first bit of the advice s received by the player, is a communication equilibrium, since all players have expected payoff 1 and no action can be taken in order to increase this payoff. Note also that this equilibrium is not canonical, since the mediator is not just suggesting an action, but more complex advices are given. Anyway, it is immediate to transform above equilibrium in a canonical one, by requiring the mediator to return only the action players are suggested to take.
Belief-invariant equilibrium
We obtain the subclass of belief-invariant equilibria by requiring that the correlation used in the equilibrium is in the class of belief-invariant correlations.
is a communication equilibrium, we call it a beliefinvariant (communication) equilibrium.
A solution (id, id, Q) is a canonical belief-invariant equilibrium if there is a belief-invariant equilibrium (f , g, Q ′ ) in its equivalence class, i.e., with Q = Q ′ .
The relation between belief-invariant equilibria and their canonical version is clarified in the following proposition, whose proof is evident and, hence, omitted.
is a belief-invariant equilibrium and Q its canonical representative, then (id, id, Q) is also a belief-invariant equilibrium, with the same payoffs as the original equilibrium.
In a caveat to the above proposition, we stress that the equivalence class of a canonical belief-invariant equilibrium (id, id, Q) may contain also solutions involving non-belief-invariant correlations. Indeed, the correlating device could provide players with information about other players even if this information is useless with respect to the choice of the strategy to play. Below we discuss an example showing how this can occur.
Finally, observe that the canonical belief-invariant equilibria of a given game G, denoted B.I.(G), form a convex set, like the canonical communication equilibria:
Proposition 8. If (id, id, Q 1 ) and (id, id, Q 2 ) are canonical belief-invariant equilibria for the same game, then so is (id, id, Q),
Proof. Just notice that Q ′ as defined in the proof of Proposition 5 is belief-invariant.
An example. Consider again the CHSH game described above. Recall the canonical communication equilibrium Q previously described, i.e. Q(00 | t 1 · t 2 = 0) = 1 and Q(01 | t 1 · t 2 = 1) = 1. It is easy to see that this equilibrium is not belief-invariant. Indeed, whenever the second player receives advice 1, his belief about the type of the first player changes, since he knows for sure that it is 1.
Still, there is a canonical belief-invariant equilibrium. Consider, indeed, the following correlation Q ′ : Q ′ (00 | t 1 · t 2 = 0) = Q ′ (11 | t 1 · t 2 = 0) = 1/2 and Q ′ (01 | t 1 · t 2 = 1) = Q ′ (10 | t 1 · t 2 = 1) = 1/2. Note that each player receives a payoff of 1 and, thus, there is no way for them to improve their utility. Anyway, each player receives advice a with probability 1/2 regardless of the other player's type. Hence, this correlation does not allow players to gain any information about other players.
We note that there are multiple equilibria that belong to the equivalence class whose canonical representative is Q ′ . In some of these equilibria the advice received by players can contain information that does not serve to the player for computing the action, but still reveal information about the other player's type. Consider for example the following correlation: Q(00, 00 | r 1 ·r 2 = 0) = Q(10, 10 | r 1 ·r 2 = 0) = 1/2 and Q(01, 11 | r 1 ·r 2 = 1) = Q(11, 01 | r 1 ·r 2 = 1) = 1/2, in which the advice not only suggests the action that the player should take, but also reveal which game the players are actually playing, and thus, which is the type of the other player.
Correlated equilibrium
We obtain the subclass of correlated equilibria by requiring that the correlation used at the equilibrium is essentially a shared random variable.
Definition 9 (Correlated equilibrium). A solution (f , g, Q) is called correlated if the output distribution of Q is independent of the input: Q(s | r) = Q(s) for all r and s. If it is a communication equilibrium, we speak of a correlated (communication) equilibrium.
Similarly to the belief-invariant case, we transfer the property of being correlated to the canonical representative Q, and we call a canonical correlation Q a canonical correlated equilibrium if there is any correlated equilibrium (f , g, Q ′ ) in its equivalence class, i.e., Q = Q ′ .
The set of canonical correlated equilibria of the game G is denoted Corr(G). Our definition is equivalent to the one of Forges (see [For82] and [For93, page 8]), who describes the correlated equilibrium as a collection Q(s), g 1 , . . . , g n , where Q is a distribution of suggestions independent of the types, and each g i : T i × S i → A i is a function that player i uses to determine their action. Indeed, note that the functions f i in a correlated solution serve no purpose, since the input r i = f i (t i ) to Q is irrelevant, and only the sampled output s i and its correlation with s −i matter. Hence, from now on we will denote a correlated solution/equilibrium simply as (g, Q), with a probability distribution Q on S.
This also allows us to exhibit a simplified equilibrium criterion.
Proposition 10. A tuple (g, Q) is a correlated equilibrium if and only if for all i, t i , s i and a i ,
Remark 11. If (g, Q) is a correlated equilibrium, then its canonical correlation Q is local in the sense of (5). Be aware, however, that we do not know if (id, id, Q) is a correlated equilibrium, because it may not have the required property that Q(a | t) is independent of t (in contrast to Proposition 7 in the belief-invariant case). Worse, even if (id, id, Q) is a communication equilibrium such that Q is a local correlation, it is not clear whether this implies that Q is a canonical correlated equilibrium in the sense of Definition 9. To show this, one would have to find a correlated equilibrium (g, Q ′ ) such that Q = Q ′ is its canonical representative. The difficulty stems from the fact that while Q can be simulated by giving a suitable shared randomness Γ = (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n ) to cooperating players, see eq. (5), to competing players it might give an advantage over the others having access to Γ directly rather than only Q.
To have a usable handle on correlated equilibria, we propose the following definition, which allows us to identify the correlated solutions to a game of incomplete information with the correlated strategies of the associated game of complete information.
Definition 12. We say that a correlated solution (equilibrium) (g, Q) is in standard form if for all i, the advice space equals the set of functions from types to actions, S i = A T i i , and if the function g i consists of evaluating the first argument (a function) on the second argument:
Clearly, such a solution is given entirely by the distribution Q on A T 1 1 × · · · × A Tn n , which we will thus use as a shorthand for a correlated solution in standard form.
The following proposition shows that the correlated equilibria in games with incomplete information, or more specifically their standard form, are precisely the correlated equilibria in the associated game of complete information that has the strategy space S i = A
The proof is evident and, hence, omitted.
Proposition 13. If (g, Q) is a correlated equilibrium, then we can obtain a correlated equilibrium Q in standard form that is in the same equivalence class, as follows:
Thus, a canonical equilibrium Q is a correlated equilibrium if and only if there exists a correlated equilibrium in standard form in its equivalence class.
Remark 14. Note that we can also define Nash equilibria in this formalism. Nash equilibria are precisely the correlated equilibria (g, Q) with a product distribution
Note that it is straightforward to see that if (g, Q) is a Nash equilibrium, then the canonical representative is also a product distribution, i.e., Q = Q 1 × · · · × Q n , and in fact a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if Q(a | t) is a canonical communication equilibrium that factorizes, i.e., Q(a | t) = Q 1 (a 1 | t 1 ) · · · Q n (a n | t n ), then there is a Nash equilibrium in its equivalence class with the same payoffs. This is obtained by writing each of the local transition probabilities
Thus, in the spirit of previous definitions, we can speak of a canonical Nash equilibrium as a factorizing canonical communication equilibrium Q(a | t). We will denote the set of canonical Nash equilibria of a game G as Nash(G).
As expected, and as it should be, the set of correlated equilibria is convex:
, Q 2 ) are correlated equilibria for the same game, with Q j a distribution on S (j) and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, then so is (g, Q) with
Proof. The proof follows from the insight that (g, Q) gives each player the information which of the two solutions (g (1) , Q 1 ) and (g (2) , Q 2 ) was implemented, so any benefit from deviating from the advice for player i would imply an advantage for the player in one of (g (1) , Q 1 ) or (g (2) , Q 2 ), contradicting the assumption that they are equilibria.
An example. Consider again the CHSH game defined above. It is easy to check that the belief-invariant equilibrium described above is not correlated. Indeed, a shared random variable is not sufficient to understand which game players are actually playing and to understand if they need to coordinate or to anti-coordinate. An example of correlated equilibrium for this game is (id, Q) with Q(00) = Q(11) = 1/2. Here, the action of each player does not depend on the other player's type. Anyway, it is still convenient for the player to follow the suggestion, since they will receive payoff 1 with probability 3/4 and there is no alternative action that allows them to receive this payoff with larger probability. Observe that this equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium, since it requires shared randomness and cannot be factorized. A Nash equilibrium with the same payoff is (id, Q) with Q(00) = 1.
General properties of the equilibrium classes
The main goal of this work is to highlight the relations between the different concepts of equilibria we have introduced so far. In particular, in Section 4, we will compare the performance of these equilibria with respect to social welfare maximization. Here, we begin by pointing out common and distinguishing features of the classes.
We have observed that there are correlated equilibria that are not Nash, belief-invariant equilibria that are not correlated, and communication equilibria that are not belief-invariant. Since communication, belief-invariant and correlated equilibria have convexity properties, we can arrange the canonical versions of these equilibria into nested sets within the set of canonical correlations Q(a | t):
where conv Nash(G) denotes the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria for G. Actually, this inclusion can be easily derived from the similar structure existing between the different classes of correlation resources behind these equilibrium concepts.
Indeed, by our previous observations, Corr(G) is always a convex subset of the local correlations LOC(A | T ), B.I.(G) is a convex subset of the non-signalling correlations BINV(A | T ), and all are contained in the set of all correlations ALL(A | T ). The inclusion structure between these classes is known (see, e.g., [MAG06] ) for full-coordination games 1 .
We go on to discuss some further issue arising with these definitions.
Necessity of an informed mediator. The correlated equilibrium class does not need an informed mediator to be implemented, since it is based on local correlations and the shared random variables are independent of the types. For some cases the players can also get rid of the mediator completely, and base their strategy on the observation of a single independent shared random variable, such as meteorological data. This however suggests that all players receive the same information as advice. There are examples of correlated equilibria where this is not given and indeed not possible, such as the game of Chicken [RC66] . Different schemes to get rid of a mediator based on communication between players have been studied in [For88] .
In contrast, in the case of belief-invariant and communication equilibria, the players seem to need a trusted mediator to implement the correlation. We say "seem" because strong experimental evidence from physics suggests that it is possible to go beyond the local correlations without a mediator by using quantum effects. However quantum mechanics cannot cover the whole class of belief-invariant correlations. The correlation (10) given below is not achievable in quantum mechanics without a mediator (as proven in [Tsi80] ). Therefore, unless quantum mechanics is falsified in the future and replaced by another theory, a mediator is needed to implement the complete belief-invariant class. The quantum mechanical class will be discussed later in Section 6.
Privacy of the players. Clearly, in order to implement a correlated equilibrium, nobody else other than player i needs to learn the type t i . The belief-invariant class allows for more correlations at the expense that a trusted mediator might learn something about the types. The use of a belief-invariant correlation guarantees however that the mediator will be the only one learning the types and no player j will learn t i . It is not always possible to respect this requirement in the more general class of communication equilibria.
Note that our concept of privacy in correlated and belief-invariant equilibria is much stronger than the well-known concept of differential privacy [PR13] . Indeed, we say that an equilibrium is private in an information-theoretic sense and assume that each player cannot obtain any new information about the other players while playing the game; differential privacy, instead, assumes only that each player cannot obtain more than epsilon information, for small and positive epsilon. Moreover, differential privacy usually guarantees privacy only when the number of players is large, while our privacy concept applies to any number of players.
Situations in which communication or correlation are useless. If our game G is really one of complete information in the sense that the types of the players are deterministically prescribed, i.e., P (t 0 ) = 1 for some t 0 ∈ T , then any communication equilibrium is equivalent to a correlated equilibrium. More precisely, for the canonical form Q of the communication equilibrium, Q 0 := Q(· | t 0 ) as a probability distribution on A = A 1 × · · · × A n is a correlated equilibrium, which has the same expected payoffs,
and similarly for any social payoffs. This reproduces the result of Zhang [Zha12] , that quantum (and indeed any) correlation doesn't change the landscape of equilibria in games of complete information beyond correlated equilibria.
Secondly, we can identify a simple class of games where the presence of no additional correlation changes the set of equilibrium payoffs; we call them (two-player) constant sum games, and they are characterized by the property that v 1 (t 1 t 2 , a 1 a 2 ) + v 2 (t 1 t 2 , a 1 a 2 ) = s(t 1 t 2 ), i.e., the sum of the two players' individual payoffs depends only on the type. This implies that regardless of the solution employed,
Thus, the game is an instance of a zero-sum game according to the theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern [vNM44] (we can make the sum of payoffs explicitly equal to zero by subtracting s(t 1 t 2 ) from v 1 (t 1 t 2 , a 1 a 2 ), but we refrain from doing so not to overload notation).
This means that there exists a (mixed) strategy Q vNM .
This explains the absence of quantum advantage in the conflict-of-interest games considered in [BL13] , as they are all of the above constant-sum type.
Computational complexity The equilibrium concept and its variations discussed so far are useful to understand the behaviour of the players. A fundamental question (see for example [PR08] ) is how one could calculate such an equilibrium or even just verify that a given set of strategies is an equilibrium, or on the other hand find an equilibrium that optimizes some other parameter, such as a social payoff. Not that much is known for the class of equilibria we just discussed. Below we mention the results we are aware of, and we leave as an interesting open problem to complete the picture. Note that, except where otherwise specified, the computational complexity will be with respect to the size of the n-player game specification, that consists of a list of probabilities P (t), for t ∈ T , and a list of the payoff function values v i (t, a), one for each player i = 1, . . . , n, each t ∈ T , and each a ∈ A. 2 Nash equilibria of complete information games are hard to find: in fact, it is known that the problem is PPAD-hard even for two-player games [DGP09, CDT09] . Since games of incomplete information contain complete-information games as a special case, they are at least as hard. On the other hand, from Proposition 2, it turns out that it is possible to check in polynomial time whether a solution (id, id, Q) in canonical form is a Nash equilibrium whenever the number of actions available to players is bounded.
Correlated equilibria of complete information games can be found in time that is polynomial in the size of the game specification through linear programming [HS89] . Recall that a game of incomplete information can be modelled as a game of complete information where the players' strategies are A
e., all possible functions from T i to A i . However, this not only disregards the special nature of the payoff functions that depend only on input-output pairs of the strategy, but exponentially increases the size of the game specification. Thus, the above result does not extend, and thus we do not know whether it is possible to find correlated equilibria in polynomial time. This result extends also to games of incomplete information.
Still, optimal correlated equilibria of incomplete information games are hard to find (they belong to the complexity class of NP-hard problems) even for full coordination games, with respect to the size of the game specification. This can be proven by embedding notoriously hard problems (like the chromatic number of a graph) into cooperative games (see, for example, the game used in [CMN + 07].
Belief-invariant equilibria of full coordination games of incomplete information can be instead found in time that is polynomial in the size of game description via linear programming. This is because the set of non-signalling correlations is defined by polynomially many nonnegative variables subject to polynomially many linear inequalities. (See, for example, the LP in [BFS14, page 8].) We do not know yet if this extends to conflict of interest games, and this is one of the major open problems in the present theory. Our intuition is that the belief-invariant equilibria of games of incomplete information are the "right" analogue of correlated equilibria of games of complete information; from this perspective one might speculate that belief-invariant equilibria can be found efficiently, such as [HS89] .
Impact of correlation on social welfare
In this section we show that no-signalling correlation can have a positive impact on the social welfare of a game. Specifically, there are games in which a belief-invariant equilibrium can achieve a social welfare that is better than every correlated equilibria. The CHSH game discussed above gives us a clear example of this fact: indeed, we showed there is a belief-invariant equilibrium that achieves an expected social welfare of 2, whereas it is not hard to see that no correlated equilibrium is better that the one described above, whose social welfare is 3/2.
However, the CHSH game is a two-player full coordination game, and one can wonder whether such a result holds even we consider games with conflict of interests and/or with more than two player. Pappa et al. [PKL + 15] give a partial answer to this question, by showing that above result holds for a two-player conflict-of-interest variant of the CHSH game. Below, we report this result for completeness. Moreover, we extend their result by presenting a n-player game with conflict of interests in which a belief-invariant equilibrium exists that is better than any correlated equilibrium. Interestingly, our game is a variant of the GHZ game, a game motivated from quantum mechanics [GHSZ90] .
Since the class of belief-invariant equilibria strictly contains the class of correlated equilibria, it may be expected that the former contains equilibria that are better than the ones in the latter class. It is instead surprising that a correlated equilibrium can perform better than any other equilibrium in the class, even unrestricted ones. However, we next show that this may be the case. In other word, we prove that locality is not only a desirable requirement, but it is sometimes necessary in order to achieve high social welfare. 
Belief-invariant equilibria can outperform correlated equilibria

Two-player games with conflict of interests
A modified version of CHSH has been used in [PKL + 15] to obtain a two-player game with conflict of interests in which there is a belief-invariant equilibrium that achieves a better expected social welfare than any correlated equilibrium. We report it here for completeness.
In this game, the players are still interested in coordinating or anti-coordinating as in CHSH, but now each player prefers a specific outcome, as follows: The pure strategies (0, 0) and (1, 1) lead to two equilibria with unfair expected payoffs, in a battle-of-sexes flavour. 3 No player has incentive to deviate from constant actions (0, 0), but the fist player has 3 4 expected payoff, while the other player has 3 8 . For the second equilibrium, constant (1, 1), we have the same unfairness, this time in favor of the second player.
The situation can be improved with the notions of communication equilibria we discussed in Section 3. With a correlated equilibrium we have a solution similar to battle-of-sexes: with one bit shared randomness one can select either the first or the second pure equilibrium uniformly. This makes the situation fair, with an expected payoff of If
This is belief-invariant because the marginal of each player is a uniformly random bit whatever the other player's type is. Notice that this correlation solves perfectly the common objective of CHSH, i.e., coordinating if t 1 · t 2 = 0 and anti-coordinating otherwise. Also, in the case t 1 · t 2 = 0 it behaves like a correlated equilibrium in the battle-of-sexes game, by selecting one of the two pure strategies (1, 1) or (0, 0) uniformly. As said above, this correlation is used in [For06, page 335], and it is well-known in the physics community as the PR-box [PR94] . It is also known that this belief-invariant correlation cannot be implemented as a local one [Tsi80] .
n-player games with conflict of interests
We now introduce a game based on an example in physics known as the GHZ state for three parties [GHSZ90] . (The result can be generalized to n parties, we chose n = 3 for simplicity.)
We have three players, each one with two possible types (which we label type 0 and 1) and two possible actions (action 0 and 1). The possible type triples (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) are taken from the set {(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)} with probability
Let τ = t 1 · t 2 · t 3 . We have Pr(τ = 1) = Pr(τ = 0) = (0 for right table, 1 for  the left table) , the strategy of player 2 chooses the row (0 for the top row, 1 for the bottom row), and the strategy of player 3 chooses the column (0 for left column, 1 for right column). Within a cell, the first value is the payoff of player 1, the second value is the payoff of player 2 and the last payoff is for player 3.
Thus, the players jointly lose the game (have all payoff 0) whenever τ = a 1 + a 2 + a 3 mod 2. In the non-losing cases, the players whose action is equal to τ receive payoff ε (a positive number very close to 0), while the others receive payoff 1.
Therefore this game, in the spirit of [PKL + 15], features both coordination and conflicting interests. The players are jointly interested in minimizing the probability of having payoff 0, while each player individually dislikes to be the one implementing the action τ in the winning cases.
In the best correlated equilibrium (in terms of expected payoff for each player), the mediator suggests to each player i the function
This always wins in the case τ = 0 and loses in the case τ = 1. It gives to each player expected payoff 2+ε 6 . The best communication equilibrium is as follows. The mediator learns the types, and if τ = 0 he suggests actions (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0) uniformly at random, while if τ = 1 he suggests actions (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0) uniformly at random. This gives to each player expected payoff 2+ε 3 . This communication equilibrium is not belief-invariant, because the marginals for the players' actions are not the same in case τ = 0 and τ = 1. For example, if a player has type 1 and receives advice for action 0, then his belief will change, assigning more probability to the case τ = 1.
Thus, in any belief-invariant equilibria, the mediator must make sure that, for all the possible triples of types, the marginal distributions of all players are the same. Since the payoff of player i is maximized when the action a i = τ , the expected social welfare for a belief-invariant equilibrium is maximized by considering a distribution Q such that the i-th marginal gives Pr Q,t (a i = 1 | t i ) = Pr Q,t (a i = 0 | t i ) = 1 2 , whatever the type t i is. This is implemented by the following distribution Q:
It is easy to see that this is a belief-invariant equilibrium, since any deviating player would decrease his own expected payoff by deviating (it makes everyone lose in at least a value of τ ). One can check that in this equilibrium each player receives a payoff of 1+ε 2 that is better than the expected payoff of the best correlated equilibrium. There are biased communication equilibria produced through an unrestricted, non-private, correlation. Such an equilibrium can have a player's expected payoff as large as 1.
Belief-invariant equilibria can outperform non-belief-invariant ones
Consider the following two-player game of incomplete information: the two players with types t 1 , t 2 ∈ {0, 1}. Each player has also two available actions, also named 0 and 1. The payoffs are as follows: Thus, if t 1 · t 2 = 0, then payoffs resemble the ones of the Prisoners' Dilemma, 4 so that it is a dominant strategy for each player to take action 0. If instead t 1 · t 2 = 1 then players are playing a full coordination game in which they prefer to take different actions. We assume that each type profile (t 1 , t 2 ) has the same probability 1 4 of being generated. Let us consider a distribution Q of the form Q(a | t). We will show that for any such distribution, if (id, id, Q) is an equilibrium and maximizes the social welfare among all the equilibria, then it is a correlated equilibrium, and hence it is belief-invariant. Note that there is no loss of generality in considering only canonical equilibria. Indeed, as stated above, if a non-canonical communication equilibrium (f , g, Q ′ ) exists with a better social welfare, then its canonical representative (id, id, Q ′ ) is still an equilibrium and has the same social welfare as (f , g, Q ′ ).
We start by stating conditions for (id, id, Q) being an equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare. A first simple observation is the following: If Q(1, a 2 | 0, t 2 ) > 0, then (id, id, Q) is not in equilibrium. Indeed, when t 1 = 0, then player 1 knows with probability 1 that t 1 · t 2 = 0, and thus it is a dominant strategy to take action 0. By symmetry, the same observation holds by inverting the roles of players. Hence, in order to have a canonical equilibrium we must have that Q is as follows: 
Proof. By Proposition 2, (id, id, Q) is an equilibrium if and only if for every i ∈ {1, 2}, t i ∈ {0, 1}, b i ∈ {0, 1} and any function χ i ∈ A
(19) As observed above, when t i = 0, (19) easily holds since, whichever the advice is, it is a dominant strategy for player i to take action 0. Hence, we only need to verify that (19) holds when t i = 1. To this aim, observe that there are only four possible functions χ i (1, ·): the identity function that sets χ i (1, a i ) = a i , the two constant functions that set χ i (1, a i ) = 0 and χ i (1, a i ) = 1 for every a i , respectively, and the negation function that sets χ i (1, a i ) = 1 − a i .
Thus, if i = 1 and b i = t i = 1, then we require that
Similarly, if i = 1 and 0 = b i = t i = 1, then we require that
Since v 1 | 1 =
(1−ε)(1−q)+p 01 +p 10 2
, it follows that all these inequalities hold if and only if conditions (13), (15), (17) are satisfied.
By repeating the same argument, we can observe that all the inequalities regarding to the second player hold if and only if conditions (14), (16), (18) are satisfied.
Let us now consider the correlation Q ⋆ that sets p = q = p 01 = p 10 = 1/2 and p 00 = p 11 = 0. It is immediate to check that conditions (13-18) are satisfied, and, hence, (id, id, Q ⋆ ) is an equilibrium.
Note also that, if t i = 0, then the player i is suggested to take action 0, regardless of the other player's type, whereas, if t i = 1, the player i uses a shared random variable to decide which action they have to take. Thus, the solution (id, id, Q ⋆ ) is equivalent to (g, Q ⋆ ), where Q ⋆ (a | t) = Q ⋆ (a) for each a, and, in particular, sets Q ⋆ (00) = Q ⋆ (11) = 0 and Q ⋆ (01) = Q ⋆ (10) = 1/2, and γ = (g 1 , g 2 ), with g i ∈ A T i ×A i i that sets g i (0, a i ) = 0 and g i (1, a i ) = a i for each a i ∈ A i . In other words, (id, id, Q ⋆ ) is a correlated equilibrium.
Finally, it is easy to check that the expected payoff that each player receives at this equilibrium is 1 − ε/2. Thus the expected social welfare of the correlated equilibrium (id, id, Q ⋆ ) is 2 − ε.
We next state the main result of this section, namely that for this game any communication equilibrium achieving an expected social welfare that is at least 2 − ε must be correlated.
Theorem 17. Any canonical communication equilibrium (id, id, Q) with expected social welfare at least 2 − ε is correlated.
Proof. Let Q be as in (12). As observed above, any canonical communication equilibrium (id, id, Q) must be distributed as Q and must satisfy conditions (13-18).
The expected social welfare of a solution (id, id, Q) is
Thus, the expected social welfare of (id, id, Q) is at least 2 − ε only if
However, since p 00 + p 11 ≥ 0, we have that
Moreover, since p ≤ 1, we also have that
and, similarly, p 11 ≤ pε. Then, for a canonical communication equilibrium (id, id, Q) with social welfare at least 2 − ε, we have, from (13), that p 10 ≥ (1 − ε)q + p 11 ≥ q, and, from (14), that p 01 ≥ p. Thus, p + q ≤ p 01 + p 10 ≤ 1. Hence and from (20) we can then conclude that q = 1 − p, p 10 = q and p 01 = p.
Therefore in any communication equilibrium (id, id, Q) that achieves welfare at least 2 − ε, the distribution Q is as follows:
whereas all the remaining probabilities are 0.
That is, if t i = 0, then the player i is suggested to take action 0, and, if t i = 1, then the player i uses a shared random binary variable with distribution (p, 1 − p) to decide which action they have to take. Thus, as above, we can rewrite the equilibrium (id, id, Q) as (g, Q), where Q(a | t) = Q(a) for each a, and, in particular, sets Q(00) = Q(11) = 0, Q ⋆ (01) = p and Q ⋆ (10) = 1 − p, and γ = (g 1 , g 2 ), with g i ∈ A T i ×A i i that sets g i (0, a i ) = 0 and g i (1, a i ) = a i for each a i ∈ A i . In conclusion, (id, id, Q ⋆ ) is a correlated equilibrium.
We remark that a communication equilibrium that is not correlated exists in this game. Consider, indeed, the correlation Q ′ that sets p = q = 0, p 01 = p 10 = 1/2 and p 00 = p 11 = 0. We have that (id, id, Q ′ ) is an equilibrium since it satisfies (13-18). However, if the type of player 1 is 1, then she is suggested to take action 0 with a larger probability when t 2 = 0 than when t 2 = 1. Thus, (id, id, Q ′ ) is not belief-invariant, and, as a consequence it is not correlated. However, as proved above, (id, id, Q ′ ) has an expected social welfare of 2 − 3 2 ε that is lower than the social welfare of (id, id, Q ⋆ ).
Potential applications
In the previous sections we introduced the concepts of correlated and belief-invariant equilibria, and briefly highlighted some of their properties, mainly with respect to privacy, computational complexity and social welfare maximization. We saw that very little is known about these equilibria, and thus these equilibrium concepts can stimulate theoretical research along these and other directions.
However, our interest in these equilibrium concepts is not only of theoretical nature. Indeed, it turns out that privacy and high social welfare are desirable properties in many real world settings. For these setting, implementing a good correlated or a good belief-invariant equilibrium can help the players to reach better equilibria guaranteeing information-theoretic privacy. We list below three examples of real-world settings in which the concepts of correlated and beliefinvariant equilibria can be relevant.
Trade secrets in markets. Suppose two or more companies are in competition for a share of the market (e.g., Coke and Pepsi, or Microsoft and Apple). Each company is trying to introduce a new product, and the features of the products are trade secrets. They have an incentive to cooperate in order to minimize the production costs but, at the same time, they have an incentive not to cooperate, as the negotiation might expose their secrets. In such a setting, if there were a trusted third party able to implement a correlated or a belief-invariant equilibrium, this would not longer be an issue.
Note that this simple example can be generalized to every setting in which players' payoff are affected by the ability of "guessing the other players' types".
Advertising. A typical setting in which the ability of guessing the other players' type is of huge importance is advertising (see, for example, [CLPR15] ). In such a setting an advertiser has a product to advertise, whose absolute quality is unknown to the potential users. The advertiser can adopt different advertising strategies (e.g., viral advertising, commercials, newspaper ads, web ads), whose success depends on the features of the subject to which the advertisement is aimed. On the other side, users would like to receive ads only for high-quality products, therefore they do not like to reveal their interests.
Hence, as above, it would be useful both for advertiser and for users to correlate their actions, so that the advertisers would be able to make more successful advertising campaign and the users could receive more ads for high-quality products than for low-quality ones. However, because of the privacy issues discussed above, this correlation may be effectively implemented only if there is a trusted mediator that is able to find a good correlated or belief-invariant equilibrium.
Coalition formation In coalition formation problems, n players want to arrange coalitions, i.e., a partition of the set of players. (As a simple example, one can imagine children organizing the two teams before a friendly football match.) Informally, a coalition formation setting relevant to us is as follows: each player has a list of desirable allies, and communicates to a mediator a ordered list of preferred subsets of the players in which they would like to be included. The mediator, then, announces the partition trying to create an equilibrium that maximizes player's happiness with the choice. In such a setting, a belief-invariant correlated equilibrium could help designing solutions where the players' real preferences are kept secret. For recent developments on coalition formation, see [GFInG16] and the references therein.
Network congestion. Another example in which correlated and belief-invariant equilibria may be useful is for network congestion. Suppose that the routes taken by people driving during rush hours were correlated in some way. (An example could be a GPS device or smartphone application, on which people select their starting and destination points and receive a suggested route.) Can this correlation reduce the congestion of the network? As we show next, not only this is possible, but this correlation can also be implemented privately, so that the suggestion does not reveal the sources or the destinations of other players. Note that this may be required in order to avoid privacy leakages.
Specifically, we show an application of belief-invariant equilibria in network congestion games (aka selfish routing). Here, a network is modelled as a labelled graph G, defined by a set V of vertices, a set of edges E ⊂ V × V and for each (u, v) ∈ E a cost function c uv : N → R. A network congestion game goes as follows. Each player is associated with a source and a target node and they have to decide the route to take. The strategy set for a player contains all possible paths from source to target, and the utility for a player is minus the sum of the cost functions in the edges of the chosen path. The edges get "congested" as a function of the number of players using them, i.e., if x players choose edge (u, v), then each of them faces cost c uv (x).
We consider an "incomplete information" version of network congestion games, where the source-targets are decided by the players' types. Then, by tweaking the CHSH game we can exhibit an instance of selfish routing that demonstrate that belief-invariant equilibria can help reducing the social cost. Our example is illustrated in Figure 5 . The game goes as follows: there are two players, with binary types selected uniformly at random. The source-target pairs are chosen as follows:
• if t i = 0 then Player i starts at vertex s 0 and wants to reach t,
• if t i = 1 then Player i starts at vertex s 1 and wants to reach t.
The strategies can be summarized in two meaningful choices: from his source point, a player can decide to go UP towards the vertex u or DOWN towards the vertex d and from there take final step towards t. (10) gives an equilibrium with expected cost of 3 2 .. Note that one can introduce conflict of interest into the game above by modifying the network in Figure 5 as illustrated in Figure 7 .
In this graph, whatever the types are, always assign Player 1 to target t ′ and Player 2 to target t ′′ . Now the fist player will prefer the strategy UP and the second player will prefer the strategy DOWN, in a situation similar to the game in Figure 2 .
Quantum equilibria
In this section we define the class of quantum correlated solutions and equilibria of games, which is a physically motivated subclass of belief-invariant solutions and equilibria. This class is interesting because it allows us to go beyond the local correlations without the need of an informed trusted mediator. Rather, like the correlated equilibria, it only requires the (still trusted) distribution of a prior shared resource: a quantum state. To make use of it, the players need the capability to store this quantum information, and to make measurements on it at will, according to their type. The measurement result then informs their action.
Quantum formalism
In the interest of being self-contained, we briefly present the mathematical formalism necessary to introduce and discuss quantum correlated equilibria. (For more details, see [NC00, Wil13] .) Mathematically, a state is given by a density operator ρ acting on a complex Hilbert space H, which means that ρ is positive semidefinite, ρ ≥ 0, and has unit trace, Tr(ρ) = 1. Every density operator can occur as the state of a system.
A measurement on the quantum system with Hilbert space H is given by a resolution of the identity, or positive operator valued measure (POVM), which is a collection (M s : s ∈ S) of positive semidefinite matrices M s ≥ 0, one for each possible outcome s ∈ S of the measurement, acting on H i and such that s M s = 1 1. Every resolution of the identity can be realized in a quantum mechanical experiment.
States and measurements are the way quantum theory encodes the observable features of physical systems. The fundamental formula is Born's rule, which determines the probability of observing an outcome:
Pr{s | ρ} = Tr ρM s .
The above-mentioned rules for states and measurements make sure that these numbers are always nonnegative, and add up to 1 for each state and each measurement. This formalism includes classical probability theory, by restricting to diagonal states ρ and measurement operators M s (in some fixed, "computational" orthonormal basis {|x }):
where |x x| denotes the projector onto the line C|x . In his case, the conditions for a state are equivalent to r x ≥ 0 and x r x = 1, i.e., (r x ) x is a probability vector; the conditions for a measurement reduce to s µ s (x) = 1 for all x, i.e., [µ s (x)] s,x is a stochastic matrix.
Note that for simplicity, we assume the discrete setting here: the Hilbert spaces are all finite dimensional and the measurements have discrete sets of outcomes.
In our multi-player games, we associate a Hilbert space H i to each player's quantum system, while their joint quantum system is described by the tensor product Hilbert space H = H 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ H n . If each player has a measurement M i = (M i s i : s i ∈ S i ) acting on H i , we associate to them a joint measurement M 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ M n = M s : s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S acting on H:
Then, for a state ρ acting on the composite Hilbert space H,
To make the link with the correlations discussed in the previous sections, consider the situation that every player i has access to several measurements M r i , r i ∈ R i , for simplicity all with outcomes in a set S i , which however could be specific to the player. Now, given a state ρ and the measurements M r i , the probability of outputs s 1 , . . . , s n given the players' inputs r 1 , . . . , r n is Q(s 1 , . . . , s n | r 1 , . . . , r n ) = Tr ρ(M r 1
This is evidently a correlation, and the correlations that can be written in the above form, with a suitable state and suitable measurements, are called quantum correlations, their set denoted Q(S | R). (See, for example, the definition in the survey [Pal15] .)
Fact 18 (Belief-invariance of quantum correlations). The correlation Q obtained as in eq. (22) is always belief-invariant.
Proof. Let I and J = N \ I be a partition of N . Recall that for all j and r j ∈ R j we have
and we are done.
Remark 19. Any local correlation Q,
can be obtained in the form (22), with a suitable state and measurement. Namely,
Thus we have,
Bell [Bel64] and Tsilerson [Tsi80] prove that the above inclusions are strict.
Quantum solutions and quantum correlated equilibria
We are now ready to give the definition of a quantum correlated equilibrium. To start, a quantum solution for a game consists of local measurements M t i = (M t i a i : a i ∈ A i ) for player i, t i ∈ T i , on a suitable local Hilbert space H i , and a state ρ on H = H 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ H n . This defines a correlation in canonical form,
and hence expected payoffs for the players,
In strategic form, the "quantum correlated" canonical game goes as follows. A mediator, who does not know the players' types, has a correlation device that produces the state ρ. The players trust the mediator in using such device correctly. He sends to each player i the corresponding part of the state in the space H i . He also suggests the measurements {M t i : t i ∈ T i } to use as a strategy. Note that there is no need for the players to reveal their types to the mediator, just as in the case of correlated solutions.
The definition of equilibrium is basically the same as before; we want to capture the idea that no player has an incentive to deviate from the advice unilaterally.
Definition 20 (Quantum correlated equilibrium). A quantum solution (M t , ρ) is a quantum correlated equilibrium, if and only if for all players i and any measurements
Under the same philosophy as in the sections on belief-invariant and correlated equilibria, we then call the canonical solution Q as in eq. (23) a canonical quantum correlated equilibrium, the set of which is denoted Quantum(G).
The following proposition simplifies the equilibrium condition by looking at one t i at a time, in the spirit of Proposition 10. The proof is evident and, hence, omitted.
Proposition 21. A quantum solution (M t , ρ) is a quantum correlated equilibrium, if and only if for all players i, types t i , and any measurement
Remark 22. Verifying that (M t , ρ) is a quantum correlated equilibrium can be done via semidefinite programming. As argued in [PKL + 15], and formalized in the above Proposition 21, one can fix the other players' strategies and check that for each type t i the optimal strategy of player i is M t i . Since this must be done for each type profile, the running time is polynomial in the size of the game description (or rather the description of the supposed equilibrium), but not of the game parameters.
It may seem as if we have left the formalism of communication and belief-invariant developed in the previous section, and of course that is necessarily the case since we want to talk about quantum correlations. It is however possible, although at a price, to present quantum solutions and quantum correlated equilibria in that general framework. Note that in Definition 20 above we have to consider any one player varying their measurement. Thus, define R i := M (H i , A i ) to be the set of all possible measurements on H i with outcomes in A i ; this is of course an infinite set, in fact it has the structure of a manifold, but let us not worry about that. In this way, each r i ∈ R i specifies precisely a measurement and each possible measurement is represented. Denote this (very big) correlation Q(a | r).
Proposition 23. A quantum solution (M r , ρ) is a quantum correlated equilibrium if and only if (f , id, Q) is a (belief-invariant) communication equilibrium, where f i (t i ) = r i := M t i ∈ R i is defined uniquely by the requirement that r i labels the measurement used in the quantum solution.
Furthermore, the canonical forms coincide: Q = Q.
Proof. By definition.
The class of quantum correlated equilibria contains the correlated equilibria of Definition 9 as a special case:
Proposition 24. Every correlated equilibrium is a quantum correlated equilibrium. Indeed, if (g, Q) is a correlated equilibrium, and we define the state ρ and measurements
where δ is the Kronecker delta function, then (M r , ρ) is a quantum correlated equilibrium which has the same canonical representative Q as (g, Q); in particular they have the same payoffs.
Proof. The state ρ is a mixture of classical advice. For all i, t i every measurement can also be simulated classically, and locally, with the use of private randomness. Since (g, Q) is a correlated equilibrium, no deviation from the suggested measurement can be beneficial to any player. This shows that (M r , ρ) is an equilibrium, and by (23) one can verify that its canonical isQ.
Discussion and historical background. From the definition and the observations made above, it follows that when comparing equilibrium classes at the level of their canonical representatives, quantum correlated equilibria are sandwiched between correlated and belief-invariant ones:
There are games where the inclusions are strict. A famous one is the CHSH game, which we have used extensively as an example throughout this paper. This is a non-local game, therefore a full coordination Bayesian game. It follows from [CHSH69] that there is a quantum equilibrium which is not in Corr(CHSH), and [Tsi80] proved that the belief-invariant equilibrium given by (10) is not in Quantum(CHSH). Both results, though elementary mathematically, constituted breakthroughs in the foundations of quantum mechanics. The study of quantum correlations appears in many works in physics and computer science (see, for example, the surveys [AMO08, Pal15] and the references therein). On the other hand, there have been several approaches for the use of quantum correlations in game theory (as illustrated extensively in the survey [GZK08] Physicists often imagine ideal devices called "non-signalling boxes" that implement all the class of belief-invariant correlations without revealing the types to a mediator. However, quantum mechanics is the best-known theory to describe our reality, and there is no known superquantum theory that allows the existence of the non-signalling boxes. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge of nature, the quantum class is the best feasible way of obtaining correlations without revealing players' types to a mediator.
Implementing the best belief-invariant equilibrium for GHZ with quantum correlations
Consider the game of Section 4.1.2. The correlation Q described in (11) can be implemented as a quantum correlated equilibrium, therefore it does not need an informed mediator. To see this, we will now exhibit one of the constructions of the quantum state and the measurements that produce the correlation. It can be checked via eq.(22) that the above state and measurements produce the claimed correlation Q.
Proposition 26. The considered quantum strategy is a quantum correlated equilibrium.
Proof. To prove the claim, we fix the measurements of any two parties and then show that the third party by changing his measurements cannot increase his average payoff. Since the shared state is symmetric under the permutation of parties, it is sufficient to consider the case in which measurements of party-1 are variable and measurements of parties 2 and 3 are fixed to M i j , where i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Measurements of party-1 can be expressed as X 0 0 + X 0 1 = I (on input 0), and X 1 0 + X 1 1 = I (on input 1). The general operators defining these measurements are:
where (α, a) ∈ R 4 , a = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ), and a ≤ α ≤ 2 − a ;
Note that the constraints on the parameters in the above equations implies that a ≤ 1 and b ≤ 1. The expected value of the i-th party, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is given by,
On substituting the values for probability distribution of inputs, quantum probabilities, and utilities, in eq. (24), and simplifying, we obtain that:
Now, using 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1, and constraints on parameters (α, a) and (β, b), it follows that
The upper bound on f 0 is achieved for α = 1, a = (1, 0, 0), therefore, max(f 0 ) = 
Due to symmetry in the shared state, we get same results when varying the measurements of some other party by keeping remaining two parties measurements fixed, therefore, max( v i ) = 1+ε 2 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This proves that the considered strategy is a quantum equilibrium.
We remark that a similar approach (modifying the game in [GHSZ90] ) has been used independently in [SZY15] to obtain a 3-player quantum game with conflict of interest. Clearly, players have conflict of interest in this modified GHZ game. This game has a very interesting connection with the 3-party Mermin inequality [Mer90] :
where, for i, j, k ∈ {0, 1}, the random variables A i , B j , C k take value ± 1.
In game theoretical terminology, it can be thought that i, j, k are types of the three players and A i , B j , C k ∈ {±1} correspond to the respective actions. The expected values of the product of the outcomes are:
A i B j C k = {P ijk (+1, +1, +1) + P ijk (+1, −1, −1) + P ijk (−1, +1, −1) + P ijk (−1, −1, +1)} − {P ijk (−1, −1, −1) + P ijk (−1, +1, +1) + P ijk (+1, −1, +1) + P ijk (+1, +1, −1)}.
We do the following relabelling of the actions: −1 → 0 and +1 → 1, and we get (by labelling the actions in the subscript): On substituting (27) in (26), using normalization condition for probabilities, and rearranging, we get, Let M = A 0 B 0 C 1 + A 0 B 1 C 0 + A 1 B 0 C 0 − A 1 B 1 C 1 , then M = 4 − 2P. The bound we see on quantity M is derived by considering all possible local correlations, therefore, nonlocal (quantum, no-signalling, or signalling) correlations can violate these bounds. However, M also has algebraic bounds, −4 ≤ M ≤ 4, which is respected by any type of correlation (or probability distribution). The algebraic restriction on M implies that 0 ≤ P ≤ 4 for any type of correlation. One important feature of Mermin inequality is that its algebraic bounds can be achieved by quantum correlations. We will use this feature of the Mermin inequality to discover interesting properties in the game that we are considering here.
For the game of Figure 8 , the sum of expected payoffs of the three players turns out to be:
For any local strategy (correlated or uncorrelated)
For any possible strategies (quantum, belief-invariant or communicating):
If the game is played with the same correlation (11) (which we implemented as a quantum strategy in Section 6.3), the expected payoff v i = 2+ε 3 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Moreover, the strategy is a quantum equilibrium (the proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 26; only the objective function changes which is again easy to maximize).
Therefore, an interesting feature of the game of Figure 8 is that with the considered quantum protocol we obtain the optimal fair equilibrium, i.e, no other quantum equilibrium, beliefinvariant equilibrium, or even communication equilibrium can do better than this protocol in our second GHZ game. This is a new feature which was not revealed in the two party modified CHSH-game considered in [PKL + 15] where optimal fair quantum correlated equilibrium was found, however, for the modified CHSH-game belief-invariant equilibrium, and communication equilibrium can do better than the optimal quantum fair equilibrium.
Conclusions and open problems
We have formally introduced the class of belief-invariant communication equilibria and its quantum mechanical version. Even if such classes appeared implicitly in previous work, a systematic study and an hunt for useful applications was not performed before. With this work we would like to open the way for collaboration between the quantum information and the game theory community, to address the numerous open problems. We conclude the paper with a list of the ones we could think of.
1. Complete the complexity scenario. In Section 3.4 we discuss some computational complexity facts. For example, verifying that a solution is an equilibrium is easy if the number of actions is bounded, while finding the optimal (quantum) correlated equilibrium is a hard task, given the connection with multi-prover interactive proofs. However, how difficult is to sample a quantum or a belief-invariant equilibrium? Are there classes of games where this is easy, like the succinct games of [PR08] ?
2. Get large separations and upper bound the largest possible separation. Full coordination games are used to design Bell tests, experiments that quantify how different quantum mechanics is from classical physics. For this fundamental task, the quantity of interest is the separation between the largest expected payoff at a quantum and at a correlated equilibrium. The race for large separations was settled in [BRSdW12] , where the authors exhibited a game that almost matches the upper bound proven in [JPPG + 10]. In our context here, large separations would translate to economical or social convenience of implementing communication equilibria while respecting the privacy of the player. Are there conflict-of-interest games where the quantum correlated equilibrium leads to a much better social optimum than the correlated one? Is there an upper bound like the one of [JPPG + 10]?
3. Can any non-local game be converted in a conflict-of-interest game? This is a question from [PKL + 15]. The non-local games are the above-mentioned coordination games used in physics. It would be interesting if all these games also lead to cases in which a conflictof-interest situation can be improved with quantum or belief-invariant correlations.
4. Application to other relevant games. This is a very natural question. Can belief-invariance be beneficial for scheduling problems, market dynamics, and any other topic of practical interest?
5. Development of automatic belief-invariant advice on large network games. We have shown in Section 5 that belief-invariance can be useful in network games. Can we design an automatic system that calculates and distributes belief-invariant advice to large-scale network, in order to reduce the congestion? This does not need to be optimal, and an approximation would already have great practical applications.
